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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 18-3723
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHAMIR KANE,
Appellant
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-16-cr-00403-001)
District Judge: Eduardo C. Robreno
______________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 22, 2019
BEFORE: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 23, 2020)
______________
OPINION
______________
COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Shamir Kane appeals from the criminal judgment entered by the United



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. We will affirm.
I.
An Eastern District of Pennsylvania grand jury returned a fourth superseding
indictment charging Kane as well as Tanaya Martin with conspiracy to commit Hobbs
Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), Hobbs Act robbery, id., and using and carrying a
firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). These charges arose out of the
armed robbery of a T-Mobile store in Philadelphia on August 6, 2016. Kane and Lamar
Griffin were also charged with Hobbs Act robbery and using and carrying a firearm
during a crime of violence in connection with the armed robbery on August 22, 2016 of
another T-Mobile store located in Cheltenham Township, Pennsylvania. Kane, Martin,
and Ashley Sterling were charged with tampering with a witness to the August 6 robbery
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2). Kane and Martin were charged in a second count
of witness tampering in connection with another incident involving a witness to the
August 6 robbery (and Martin was charged with bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)).
Robert Gilmore had previously pled guilty to charges arising out of the August 6
robbery. Martin, Griffin, and Sterling pled guilty to the charges against them. Kane filed
a motion to sever the August 22 robbery charges from the August 6 robbery and witness
tampering charges. The District Court denied his motion. The jury found Kane guilty on
all counts, and he filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal as well as a motion for a new
trial. Kane raised two evidentiary challenges: (1) that Griffin’s admission at his guilty
plea hearing that he committed the August 22 robbery with Kane was improperly
admitted as substantive evidence after he had testified at Kane’s trial that Kane was not
2

one of the individuals who robbed the Cheltenham T-Mobile store; and (2) that the
evidence of the August 6 robbery was inadmissible as evidence of the August 22 robbery.
The District Court denied both motions. Kane was sentenced to a total of 408 months’
imprisonment.
II.1
Initially, Kane challenges the District Court’s determination that the charges
against him were properly joined for trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.2
However, “Kane agrees that Counts Two, Three and Four, which pertain to the August
6th robbery, were properly joined pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) with Counts Five and
Six, which pertain to the August 22nd robbery, because they are ‘of the same or similar
character,’ i.e., Hobbs Act robbery.” (Appellant’s Brief at 13.) He also acknowledges
that “Counts Seven and Eight, which involve witness tampering offenses stemming from
the August 6th robbery, were properly joined with Counts Two, Three, Four because
‘they were connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.’” (Id. at 13The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
We render an independent determination as to whether there was an improper
joinder. See, e.g., United v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2003). The District
Court and Kane have applied Rule 8(a) (“(a) Joinder of Offenses. The indictment or
information may charge a defendant in separate counts with 2 or more offenses if the
offenses charged-whether felonies or misdemeanors or both-are of the same or similar
character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute
parts of a common scheme or plan.”). The government asserts that this matter is
governed by Rule 8(b) (“(b) Joinder of Defendants. The indictment or information may
charge 2 or more defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or
offenses. The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately.
All defendants need not be charged in each count.”). The joinder at issue here was proper
under both subsections.
1
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14.) He argues that the witness tampering charges were improperly joined with the
August 22 robbery charges because there was no similarity or other nexus between these
charges. But Kane “cites no cases for his proposition that the joinder of two unrelated
offenses is improper where they are each separately properly joined to a third offense that
is also charged in the same indictment.” United States v. Kane, CRIMINAL ACTION
No. 16-403-01, 2018 WL 10016115, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018). “[T]he Witness
Tampering Charges and the Second Robbery Charges were each properly included in the
fourth superseding indictment because they each have a connection to the First Robbery
Charges that appear in that same indictment[.]” Id.
“If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a
consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may
order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that
justice requires.”3 Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). The District Court appropriately summarized
the factors that guide its exercise of discretion, including whether the presentation of
separate counts with distinct and extensive evidence would confuse the jury, whether the
charging of several crimes would lead to jury hostility, and whether the jury would be
able to segregate the evidence as to each count. It recognized there were a number of
differences between the two robberies (e.g., the August 6 robbery occurred in West
Philadelphia in the early morning, involved two armed men and one woman, the woman
stuffed the cell phones into a bag, and Kane and others allegedly tampered with the
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We review the denial of a severance motion for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir. 2001).
4

witnesses while, in contrast, the August 22 robbery occurred in the evening in
Cheltenham, involved three men and one firearm, and the men had the employees put the
cell phones in the bag). The two incidents also involved different victims and law
enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, there were some clear similarities, “including the
type of store, type of merchandise stolen, number of accomplices, use of a gun, and the
robbers’ method of arriving when the store was empty of customers and forcing the
employees to the back of the store at gunpoint to load the phones into a gym bag.” Kane,
2018 WL 10016115, at *1 n.1. “In addition, the robberies occurred at stores a few miles
apart and took place within three weeks of each other.” Id. “[T]he phones were later
sold through the same individual[.]” Id. There was also evidence that Kane sent Sterling
text messages about both robberies.
The District Court properly disposed of Kane’s request for severance. Given the
circumstances, it appropriately determined that the evidence regarding each robbery was
admissible to prove the identity of the perpetrator in the other robbery under Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b). Likewise, the probative value of this evidence did not substantially
outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. According
to Kane, the evidence of the witness tampering charges “opened the door to the jury
viewing Kane as a violent individual in its evaluation of the events of August 22nd for
which there was a paucity of evidence.” (Appellant’s Brief at 15.) However, a defendant
“must ‘pinpoint clear and substantial prejudice resulting in an unfair trial,’” United States
v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 335 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d
309, 340 (3d Cir. 1992)), and the District Court adequately explained that this burden was
5

not satisfied. See, e.g. United States v. Bornman¸559 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (“It
follows from this that a defendant is not entitled to a severance solely on the basis that the
evidence in regard to certain counts is more damaging than evidence in regard to other
counts.”); United States v. Lore¸430 F.3d 190, 205 (3d Cir. 2005) (indicating that, where
multiple charges are “relatively straightforward and discrete,” we do not “doubt that the
jury could have been expected to compartmentalize the evidence”).
According to Kane, the District Court also erred by admitting Griffin’s one-word
assent to the statement of facts read by the prosecutor at his guilty plea hearing as
substantive evidence.4 He argues that the rationale of United States v. Universal
Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 205 F.3d 657 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), applies with equal
force to statements made in a witness’s guilty plea colloquy as it does to the witness’s
plea agreement and the plea itself—and accordingly such statements could not be used as
substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt. (See, e.g.¸ Kane’s Reply Brief at 6 (“But,
for the reasons set forth in the principal brief, Universal Rehabilitation rejects the
government’s theory of admissibility because ‘[Kane] had a right to have his guilt or
innocence determined by the evidence presented against him, not by what has happened
with regard to a criminal prosecution against [Griffin].” (quoting Universal
Rehabilitation, 205 F.3d at 668 (footnote omitted) (alterations in the original)).) The
government did not suggest that Kane was guilty simply because of Griffin’s guilty plea.
Instead, the District Court appropriately admitted the admission as non-hearsay evidence
4

We exercise plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, while its ruling to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 1996).
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under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) (providing that statement is not hearsay
where declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about prior statement and
statement is inconsistent with testimony and was given under penalty of perjury at trial,
hearing, or other proceeding or in deposition). It is undisputed that Griffin assented
under penalty of perjury to the prosecution’s summary of the factual basis of his plea,
which included assertions that he had committed the August 22 robbery with Kane. At
Kane’s subsequent trial, he denied that Kane was one of the perpetrators and testified that
he had lied to both the FBI and at the plea hearing. The District Court, in turn, complied
with Universal Rehabilitation’s directive to provide a jury instruction on the limited
purposes for which it may consider the guilty plea and plea agreement (i.e., to assess the
witness’s credibility, to eliminate any concern that the defendant has been singled out, or
to explain how the witness had first-hand knowledge). See Universal Rehabilitation, 205
F.3d at 668.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the criminal judgment entered by the
District Court.
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